# ARPA2 phase 1: SecureHub¶

The SecureHub phase establishes a number of foundations for security. In spite of all the attention that has gone into our online security, much of it does not really come together.

This is the first phase of ARPA2, and it is targeted at delivering a number of security premises on which the later phases can build. The end-user appeal of this layer is not very direct, but without this the IdentityHub phase would not be possible.

The main projects in SecureHub are:

• TLS Pool is a daemon that takes TLS out of applications. The reasoning is that application developers have another mind set (namely, a functional drive) than security experts (who want to lock out anything dangerous) and that these are best handled in different bits of software. The TLS Pool is a background program, with its own memory regions, in which it may juggle credentials without the application ever needing to worry about it. The interface between TLS Pool and application talks of identities, in the form of a domain name or a user under a domain name; integration with the TLS Pool from an application’s perspective tends to take only an hour!
• SteamWorks distributes configuration information over LDAP. This means that central configuration (or, if you like the term, provisioning of configuration) is possible. This is useful in many situations where users are less qualified to do so, and prefer to leave technical matters to a more qualified person, be it a company’s administrator or a security service provider. Although SteamWorks makes it possible to centralise control, it still is a matter of subscription from the client’s end — and therefore, a choice made on the client machine.
• Kerberos is a very old security protocol, but it is also the best option when dealing with centralised authentication. So, if you are to centrally manage accounts for users, groups and roles, as well as secure connections to services and machines, then Kerberos is ideal. This is the customary choice in companies of any reasonable scale (they might call it Active Directory, Samba, FreeIPA or Windows for Workgroups — but that still means they use Kerberos for authentication). In the IdentityHub phase, we will turn to extensions that make Kerberos suitable as a mechanism for the Internet as a whole and for card-swipe usage patterns; but in the SecureHub phase, our aim is to use it locally, under our own domain or realm.
• TLS-KDH introduces Kerberos in TLS. We do this in a modern way, where we always incorporate the mechanisms for Forward Secrecy. The integration of Kerberos with HTTP or HTTPS is surprisingly weak, even if it is in high demand. Adding a strong Kerberos mechanism to TLS means that we can use it in HTTPS, but also for STARTTLS-styled protocols like mail, chat and telephony — the list of uses is virtually endless. Given that the call for TLS is resounding these days, and given the inefficiency of doing this with X.509 certificates, it is good to know that our research has shown that authentication with TLS-KDH is about 5000 times as efficient as when using X.509 certificates.

After the SecureHub project, it is our hope to see a lot of spin-off work. It should not surprise anyone that TLS-KDH is integrated into the TLS Pool, so any application using that has a great opportunity of hooking into the InternetWide Architecture.

Proper integration of the TLS Pool does not only mean adding a generic TLS tunnel around it (though one is delivered with the TLS Pool), because that leaves the problem of communicating the authenticated identities of the two sides to the wrapped program. The best integration comes from a client program, be it a web server or client or proxy, or perhaps mail tools. When these start to communicate TLS, they may hand off their socket to the TLS Pool, indicate what is being expected about identities and tell the TLS Pool to start shaking hands with the other side. When done, the TLS Pool should respond with the authenticated identities of the local and remote end, or none if they could not be authenticated. The program then continues over a new socket, speaking the plaintext version of the protocol but resting assured that an external daemon handles connection privacy and integrity in just the way the user likes to have that handled. The authenticated identities can henceforth be used in the application program.

This use of the TLS Pool means that TLS-KDH can be used where it is supported — a great gain in efficiency, and proponents of short-lived credentials might argue that the security is also under much tighter control. Future extensions to Kerberos, such as realm crossover and pseudonymity will all be handled automatically. And when the IdentiyHub starts supporting centralised creation of new identities, the TLS Pool will follow suit — and the application can safely ignore any such thing.

We even intend to extend the TLS Pool idea at some point, to incorporate alternatives to TLS, such as SSH and GSS-API based protocols. This would lead to a slightly modified flow in applications, but only during their call for a handshake — after that they would once more have authenticated identities on each end, and reliance on another program to handle privacy and authenticity. This could give rise to alternative protocol elements such as STARTSSH and STARTGSS — thereby allowing us to switch from TLS to another security protocol if we feel so inclined. In security, it is always good to have one to throw away, just to help us instantly resolve security problems when the need arises.